California Employment Law Refresher: Reasonable Accommodations for Employees Who Are Associated with Persons Who Have a Disability

In addition to prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) also prohibits employers from discriminating against employees (and applicants) based on their association with another person who is, or is perceived to be, disabled.

Because the FEHA also requires employers to engage in the interactive process and to make reasonable accommodations for the known disabilities of employees to enable them to perform a position’s essential functions, the next logical question is whether those obligations also extend to individuals who are not themselves disabled but are associated with another person who is, or is perceived to be, disabled. While not definitively addressed by California’s highest court, the answer to that question is possibly.

So what does case law say about reasonable accommodations for individuals associated with persons who are disabled? As the court noted in Vega v. YapStone, Inc. (2021) No. A160884, 2021 WL 2678385, “[p]ublished California cases discussing associational disability discrimination are rare” and “no published California case has directly decided” the issue with regard to the interactive process and reasonable accommodations.

One of the first published cases to touch upon the issue was Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1028. In that case, the plaintiff worked as a truck driver and needed an accommodated schedule in order to leave work in time to administer dialysis treatment for his son, who was disabled. His employer initially accommodated that request but changed his schedule when a new supervisor came on board and subsequently terminated his employment for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son’s treatment.

The court noted that “no published California case has determined whether employers have a duty under [the] FEHA to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee who is associated with a disabled person.” It went on to acknowledge that the language of Government Code section 12940(m), which addresses an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodations, “does not expressly refer to persons other than an applicant or employee” and only expressly “makes it an unlawful employment practice ‘. . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.’” The court noted, however, that Government Code section 12926(o) defines “disability” to include a “perception that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have,” a disability. In other words, association with a disabled person may itself be a disability under the FEHA and Government Code section 12940(m) “may reasonably be interpreted to require accommodation based on the employee’s association with a physically disabled person.”

Ultimately, however, because the plaintiff abandoned his reasonable accommodation claim prior to appeal, the Castro-Ramirez court never reached a decision on this issue; it “observe[d] that the accommodation issue [was] not settled” and expressly did “not decide whether [the] FEHA establishes a separate duty to reasonably accommodate employees who associate with a disabled person.” Instead, the court focused on the disability discrimination claim, which it noted was “significantly intertwined” with reasonable accommodation but focused on whether there was “sufficient evidence that discriminatory animus motivated [the] refusal to honor [the] plaintiff’s scheduling request” and the plaintiff’s termination. Based on the fact that the supervisor knew the plaintiff needed to finish his assigned route in time to administer treatment to his son but nevertheless scheduled him for a later shift even though a customer specifically requested the plaintiff be assigned for earlier deliveries, the court found there were disputed issues of material fact that prevented summary adjudication of the disability discrimination claim.

The opinion did not end there, however. Following the majority opinion, the dissent went on to question the majority’s position that it did “not decide whether [the] FEHA establishes a separate duty to reasonably accommodate employees who associate with a disabled person” while simultaneously stating, in dicta, that Government Code section 12940(m) “may reasonably be interpreted to require accommodation based on the employee’s association with a physically disabled person.” The dissent set forth several bases to challenge the majority’s opinion and concluded, “In short, the conduct at the heart of [the] plaintiff’s claim is defendant’s refusal to assign a shift that would allow [the] plaintiff to tend to his disabled son. No authority has held an employer must do so, and nor should we.”

Thereafter, California courts in two unpublished decisions considered the Castro-Ramirez majority opinion’s statutory interpretation (made in dicta) and rejected it, concluding that reasonable accommodation and interactive process claims could not be based on associational disability. See Monterroso v. Hydraulics Int'l Inc. (2022) No. B299946, 2022 WL 33250, at *10 (“the FEHA does not recognize a reasonable accommodation claim based on associational disability for the same reasons it does not recognize an interactive process claim based on associational disability); Shahin v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2023) No. B307750, 2023 WL 3166730, at *12 (“consistent with the plain language of [the] FEHA and the legislative history, we conclude [the] FEHA does not impose reasonable accommodation or interactive process obligations on an employer based on an employee’s association with a family member or other person who has a disability).

Meanwhile, several federal district courts, primarily also unpublished opinions, reached the opposite conclusion and determined that the FEHA could be interpreted to provide for reasonable accommodation and interactive process claims based on associational disability. See McVay v. DXP Enterprises, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2022) 645 F. Supp. 3d 971 (concluding the court’s “best prediction on the viability of” these claims is that “the FEHA permits employees to bring accommodation and interactive process claims based on a theory of associational disability”); see also Castro v. Classy, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2020) No. 3:19-CV-02246-H-BGS, 2020 WL 996948, Acosta v. NAS Insurance Services, LLC (C.D. Cal., Mar. 31, 2025) No. 2:25-CV-00656-MCS-PVC, 2025 WL 975007, Head v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (N.D. Cal., June 5, 2025) No. 24-CV-01203-EMC, 2025 WL 1592737, and Ransom v. Mayorkas (C.D. Cal. 2025) No. 2:24-CV-05433-CAS-MAAX, 2025 WL 1883853.

So what does all of this mean? As the Head court noted, “[t]here is a split among courts as to whether accommodation claims can be based on associational disability.” Despite there being a split, this means that at least some courts have concluded that such claims (both failure to reasonably accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process) may be viable. In addition, until the split is finally resolved, the California Civil Rights Department (CRD)— the state agency charged with enforcing California's civil rights laws—is currently accepting charges based on these theories of liability.

As a result, employers should review each request for accommodation carefully before responding. In addition to potential obligations under the FEHA to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations, other state and federal laws provide qualified employees with rights regarding time off to care for family members, e.g., the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Each of these laws, and any other applicable laws, should be considered in responding to individual requests for accommodation.

This legal update and any use of its information does not create an attorney-client relationship. Nothing contained on this website should be considered legal advice for any specific employer or employment situation. Consult legal counsel before taking any action as a result of information contained herein.