California Appellate Court Upholds Prospective Meal Period Waiver for Work Periods of Five to Six Hours: Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc.
The Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Wage Orders and California Labor Code section 512 require employers to provide nonexempt employees with a 30-minute, off-duty meal period when they work more than five hours, and a second meal period when they work more than 10 hours in a day. If the employee does not work more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and employee. Likewise, if the employee does not work more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee if the first meal period was not waived.
This week, on April 21, 2025, in Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc., the Second Appellate District for the California Court of Appeals held that revocable, prospective meal period waivers for work periods between five and six hours are enforceable under Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders 4 and 5 in the absence of any evidence that the waivers are unconscionable or unduly coercive. Stated another way, the court confirmed that employers and employees may agree in writing to prospectively waive the first meal period before the right to take it accrues so long as the agreement is revocable and not otherwise improper. The court’s ruling specifically addressed prospective written waivers for work periods that do not exceed six hours in a day, and was focused on employees who fall within IWC Wage Orders 4 and 5. The court did not address whether oral waivers of meal periods are permissible, nor did it consider whether the second meal period waiver for work periods between 10 and 12 hours may be done prospectively.
Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc. involved a putative class action on behalf of various employees at a network of veterinary hospitals. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer violated California law by requiring employees to work shifts between five and six hours without a meal period and without “waiving their legally mandated meal periods by mutual consent.” Specifically, the plaintiffs in that case signed waivers that stated:
I hereby voluntarily waive my right to a meal break when my shift is 6 hours or less. I understand that I am entitled to take an unpaid 30-minute meal break within my first five hours of work; however, I am voluntarily waiving that meal break. I understand that I can revoke this waiver at any time by giving written revocation to my manager.
The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plain language of Labor Code section 512 and the applicable IWC Wage Orders permit prospective “blanket” waivers. In doing so, the trial court noted that prior case law did not address “when an employer must obtain a meal break waiver” and a California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter interpreting an agricultural Wage Order did not apply to the employees at issue in the case.
On appeal, the court first looked at the plain language of Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders 4 and 5, which is silent regarding the timing (prospective or as-accrued) and form (written or oral) of meal period waivers for shifts between five and six hours. The court also noted that the terms “waived” and “waiver” were not defined, but noted that “case law has long defined waiver as ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts.’” The court then considered the legislative and administrative history of these provisions, which indicate “these laws do not reflect an intent to prohibit prospective written waivers of meal periods.”
The court further noted that California Supreme Court precedent did not support the plaintiffs’ position that “the employer’s obligation to provide a meal period must first be triggered by engaging, permitting, or suffering an employee to work more than five hours’ and thus an employee may waive a meal break only when he or she ‘has worked’ or ‘is scheduled to work . . . a shift requiring a meal break.’” Stated another way, prior case law did not require employers and employees to wait until the right to take a meal period has accrued before waiving that right. Finally, the court concluded that a 2003 DLSE opinion letter addressing IWC Wage Order 14 for agricultural employees, which concluded that “the decision to forego a meal period must be made personally by each worker on a daily basis,” did not apply to prospective meal period waivers under IWC Wage Orders 4 and 5.
Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
The court noted, however, that prospective waivers could be unenforceable where the waivers are unconscionable, where they have the effect of impeding or discouraging workers from taking statutory meal periods, where the waivers are signed unknowingly or with coercion, or where they could not be revoked at any time. Likewise, as noted above, the ruling is specific to IWC Wage Orders 4 and 5, and the court did not address: (1) whether oral waivers of meal periods are appropriate for work periods between five and six hours; or (2) whether written meal period waivers of the second meal period may be done prospectively. While it is reasonable to conclude, given the language of the statute and IWC Wage Orders and the analysis of the court, that the same reasoning would apply to second meal period waivers, this case did not specifically address that issue.
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